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Abstract
The ANC has experienced rapid membership growth in recent years. This paper
explores competing explanations for this growth, and concludes that subnational
political competition and national factional conflicts, rather than deliberate
membership recruitment campaigns, have been the primary drivers of increased
numbers. The paper goes on to assess the implications of this dynamic of
membership change for party organisational challenges.
Introduction
The African national Congress (ANC) has grown rapidly over the past
decade. At the movement’s 2002 Stellenbosch conference, membership was
reported to be a little over 400,000. By the time of the ANC’s 52nd national
conference in Polokwane in 2007, total numbers had increased to more than
620,000. Five years later, at the 53rd national conference at Mangaung,
audited membership was reported to be more than 1.2 million (ANC 2012a).
How can this growth be explained? And what are its implications for party
management?
After the banning of the ANC was lifted in 1990, it was re-built in the form
of a mass movement. However, although the ordinary branch was situated
at the heart of the organisation’s elective, selective and policy choices, ANC
elites continued to exert control through a mix of procedural manipulation,
patronage, co-option, and invented tradition (ANC 1997a, ANC 1997b, ANC
2001). The result was circumscribed internal democracy but relative political
stability (Butler 2005).
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The ANC’s character has changed as membership has grown and
leadership steering capacity has eroded. According to longstanding leaders,
many of the ANC’s new members exhibit little respect for inherited conventions
of authority and seniority. There is widespread ignorance about the
movement’s history and its core values. Further, the spread of ‘money-
politics’ and ‘careerism’ have turned the ANC into a stepping-stone to
personal gain. Meanwhile, private wealth has been recycled into internal
ANC elections to secure further intra-party power for its holders. Internal
elections and candidate selection processes have become increasingly
disfigured at all levels by factional conflict and, not infrequently, by violence
(Motlanthe 2005, Netshitenzhe 2012, Butler 2010).
The paper begins with a descriptive overview of membership trends. It
goes on in a second section to explore competing explanations for how and
why these changes in membership have come about. ANC leaders have
described membership growth as a product of rational recruitment strategies
of a national leadership pursuing some more desirable party size, shape or
character. The different philosophies that allegedly lay behind such
recruitment strategies are explored in this second section. The evidence
presented in the remainder of the paper, however, suggests that it was
political competition rather than recruitment planning that drove change.
Struggles for inclusion on candidate lists, and factional battles to secure
leadership positions, have been the key drivers of growth in recorded
membership numbers.
The third section of the paper explores these underlying dynamics by
means of an analysis of the candidate list process for the 2010 local
government elections and the role of membership numbers in provincial
leadership elections. It also explores the implications of factional contestation
in the national leadership struggle that culminated in the 2012 Mangaung
conference. The paper considers the relationship between membership
growth, party management systems, and deep organisational challenges. It
concludes with an assessment of the prospects for effective membership
system reform.
Membership trends since 1991
ANC membership data, as we shall see, are profoundly unreliable, and they
have been of doubtful accuracy since the party was reconstituted on South
African soil in the early 1990s. The first available membership estimates were
presented by then secretary general Alfred Nzo at the national elective
conference held in Durban at the end of 1991.
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Table 1. ANC membership estimates, mid-1991
Source: Adapted from ANC 1991
The heroic approximations and rounding-up that characterise these data
offer a clear signal that they cannot be taken as accurate representations of
actual recruitment outcomes. Nevertheless, the data do suggest that the
ANC was ambitious in its early membership drives, in bantustans, urban and
rural areas – with the one striking exception being Northern Natal. After the
qualified euphoria of the 1994 elections, the recorded membership of the
ANC stabilised at around 400,000 until close to the end of the decade. The
remarkable political achievement of the ‘transition’ cooled the political
temperature across the country and party activism became a less urgent
imperative. Towards the end of the decade, however, the membership
numbers presented by successive secretary-generals suggested a pattern
of accelerating growth (see table 2). This rise in members was especially
marked in advance of elective conferences, most notably the 52nd national
conference in 2007 and the 53rd national conference in 2012.
Between conferences, membership growth slowed or even went into
reverse in some provinces, a pattern especially marked in Free State,
Mpumalanga, and Northern Cape, where branches (with their ostensible
members) appeared to be resuscitated just in time to participate in elective
conferences. In some other provinces, for example Gauteng and North West,
growth was steadier, but it was nevertheless rapid enough to result in a
doubling of numbers in the decade after 2002. Most extraordinary of all,
Region February 1991 June 1991 
PWV 62,202 77,429 
N Transvaal 5,736 22,160 
E Transvaal 42,164 65,000 
W Transvaal 3,750 11,262 
N Cape 2,138 15,260 
E Cape 24,633 57,854 
W Cape 30,000 53,000 
Border 35,689 65,228 
Transkei 18,031 36,937 
N Natal - 2,500 
Natal Midlands 20,051 26,401 
S Natal 27,720 50,596 
N OFS 5,507 20,554 
S OFS 11,699 15,000 
Total 289,320 521,181 
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membership in Limpopo increased four-fold while in KwaZulu-Natal it
multiplied six-fold over the same period.
Table 2. ANC Membership from 1997
Source: Adapted from ANC 2007a, 2012b
Explaining membership growth: a national recruitment thesis
An elite organisation debates how to recruit ‘the masses’?
Across the history of the ANC, there has been ambivalence and controversy
among the leadership about the merits of recruiting a mass membership. The
movement was established as a representative body for the chiefs and
African professional classes of the country, and the region, in 1913. The
ANC maintained an elite character during the first four decades of its
existence, targeting its recruitment programmes primarily at educated Africans
who had passed through missionary schools.
The elitist character of the ANC began to change only in the 1940s, in part
as a result of burgeoning urbanisation during the country’s second industrial
revolution. The still-tiny ANC stated in 1942 (somewhat fancifully) that its
objective was to build a membership of one million (ANC 2012b); in reality
membership was only around 4,000 in 1945 (Dubow 2000: 20). Unlike the
Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), however, the ANC was not
comfortable with, or adept at, the techniques of mass political mobilisation
in towns and cities.
The CPSA organised anti-pass campaigns and other expressions of black
political protest in this decade. These included bus boycotts, strikes, land
invasions, stay-aways and localised riots. The ANC played very little role
in organising this tide of resistance. In 1943, under what remained an elitist
Province 1997 2002 2005 2007 2010 2012 Jan 2012 June 
E Cape 44,684 89,167 70,651 153,164 161,161 225,597 187,585 
Free State 40,184 33,115 38,331 61,310 41,627 76,334 121,074 
Gauteng 42,824 52,764 58,223 59,909 70,305 121,223 134,909 
KZN 64,998 53,531 75,035 102,742 192,618 244,900 331,820 
Limpopo 68,560 44,107 56,474 67,632 101,971 114,385 161,868 
Mpumalanga 38,044 48,588 48,239 54,913 46,405 98,892 132,729 
N Cape 19,894 24,390 21,608 37,267 37,122 42,342 36,428 
North West 35,800 41,388 39,006 47,353 57,911 60,319 75,145 
W Cape 30,790 29,796 33,141 36,237 40,427 43,397 38,499 
Total 385,778 416,846 440,708 621,237 749,112 1,027,389 1,220,057 
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leadership, the party published its ‘African Claims’ document that for the
first time included demands for self-government and political rights for
Africans. However, its central intention was to recruit African graduates
rather than to build a mass political party.
It took intensified racial oppression to compel a reluctant ANC to respond
with mass political mobilisation. After the end of World War II, the government
tried to turn back the tide of African urbanisation using aggressive
segregationist controls. African, coloured and Indian political leaders were
driven to stronger collaboration. At the same time, a new generation of
activists began to transform the Congress Youth League (CYL) into a vehicle
for urban mass protest politics. Starting in 1952 with the Defiance Campaign,
a prolonged shift to mass political mobilisation continued across the 1950s
(Butler 2013).
After Sharpeville, however, the ANC and other anti-apartheid parties
were banned. ANC leaders were forced to abandon domestic struggle and
the fledgling mass party virtually ceased to exist inside the country for three
decades. The leadership was obliged to turn to armed struggle, sometimes
reluctantly, and the ANC became primarily an exile movement with a
membership reduced to the low thousands (Macmillan 2009). Umkhonto
weSizwe (MK), a joint creation of the ANC and the CPSA (now restyled as
the South African Communist Party or SACP) became the largely ineffectual
instrument of the ANC’s exile military bureaucracy.
Internal mobilisation as apartheid falls
The mass struggle within South Africa thereafter unfolded at an unbridgeable
distance from the ANC’s exile leadership. The Soweto uprising in 1976 was
followed by an outflow of young activists, many of who were absorbed into
the ANC camps. Mass pro-ANC organisation in the country, however, was
to occur primarily in the 1980s, through two umbrella organisations that were
aligned with, but not subservient to, the ANC: the Congress of South African
Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the United Democratic Front (UDF).
When the ANC was unbanned in 1990, and recruitment to the movement
began in earnest, these organised mass movements were one key to early
ANC successes. Trade union membership grew from around 800,000 in 1980,
to 1,250,000 in 1983, and around 2 million by 1988 (Macun 2002: 36). Within
Cosatu there were sharp differences of opinion and philosophy about the
appropriate relationship between trade unions and the liberation movement.
Nevertheless, the biggest union by far, the National Union of Mineworkers,
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had adopted the Freedom Charter in 1987 and elected Nelson Mandela as its
honorary president (Butler 2008: 188).
The second mass formation that was broadly ANC-aligned, the UDF, also
deliberated its relationship to the ANC. Many of the organisations that
comprised the UDF – mostly notably the churches – had an ambivalent
attitude towards an ANC because of the liberation movement’s close
interrelationship with the SACP. Nevertheless, more than a year before the
UDF’s dissolution, its national executive committee (NEC) resolved that ‘the
UDF should participate fully in the establishment of ANC branches’ (Seekings
2000: 265). Many UDF leaders took up senior positions in the ANC.
‘Charterists’ on the ground in the UDF, especially inland, were often happy
to escape a UDF leadership that was widely perceived to be dominated by
Indian and coloured leaders from the coastal cities. Organisations representing
women and the youth often folded themselves into the ANC’s Women’s and
Youth Leagues (ANCWL and ANCYL) before the dissolution of the UDF.
Youth leaders who managed patronage networks and acted as power brokers
during the transitional period were often later absorbed into ANC-controlled
provincial governments.1
Further ANC recruitment resulted from deals struck between the ANC and
bantustan leaders who were seeking a rapprochement with the future party
of government. Some such leaders (for example Transkei’s Bantu Holomisa)
had a long history of association with the ANC. Other bantustan leaders took
a more cautious approach to the rise of the liberation movement but
recognised that full or partial incorporation within the ANC held out better
prospects than frontal competition with it.
Leadership strategies
In the early 1990s, ambivalence about mass politics persisted within an ANC
leadership that was still dominated by exiles and Robben Islanders. The
interim leadership core that was set up to manage the ANC’s rebirth as a mass
party was chaired by Walter Sisulu and included Nelson Mandela, Govan
Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, and Mac Maharaj. It established the legal framework
necessary to operate as a political party, created a headquarters, developed
a strategy for building the ANC at branch level, and planned a recruitment
system based on 14 regions, each of which was assigned professional
organisers. Prominent local and exile politicians were deployed to serve on
the regional interim committees in the bigger regions, such as Border,
Eastern Cape, Transkei, South Natal, and Midlands (ANC 1991: 9-10).
Secretary general Alfred Nzo, an ageing exile stalwart, was not a natural
19
The politics of numbers in the ANC
leader for a mass political movement. Like many exiles, he was alienated from
‘the masses’ on whose behalf he claimed to speak. He was aware, however,
that mass organisation was a prerequisite for ANC success in post-apartheid
politics. In his report to the Durban conference in 1991, Nzo observed that
‘mass activity is a vital component of our overall strategic direction’ (ANC
1991: 18).
Nzo cited a World Social Study suggesting that the ANC had the support
of just ‘44% of South Africans – of all races – in the city, countryside and
within and without the homelands’. He also quoted with some alarm a report
in The Star newspaper that the ANC ‘might be pressed to win a simple
majority in a national election’ (ANC 1991: 11). ‘It would be blatantly naïve
of us’, Nzo observed, ‘to become complacent’ or to ‘act as if under no
circumstances whatsoever can the ANC be threatened or even removed from
the leadership pedestal it now occupies’ (ANC 1991: 11). An activist base,
he argued, was essential to mobilise electors and to educate the populace
about the movement’s programme of government. Nzo, moreover, recognised
that a racially diverse membership was an important component of the
ANC’s legitimacy claims and he observed with concern that ‘we are not
making much progress in respect of the Coloured, Indian and White
populations’ (ANC 1991: 14).
Nzo (seemingly rather reluctantly) conceded that ‘if we correctly believe
that the masses are the makers of history then they must be involved in the
process of decision-making’ (ANC 1991: 19). Many Cosatu and UDF leaders
challenged instrumental conceptions of membership, however, and they
possessed the organisational skills and experience to attempt more ambitious
forms of mass mobilisation. There were also calls for a more participatory or
transformative conception of mass politics from elements within the SACP.
Boats, taps, and permanent mobilisation
Writing in the African Communist, in a piece that synthesised and clarified
the issues at stake, SACP intellectual Jeremy Cronin distinguished between
‘three kinds of strategic outlook informing our national liberation movement’,
which he characterised as ‘the boat, the tap and the Leipzig way’ (Cronin
1992). The ‘don’t rock the boat’ outlook privileged elite pacting over mass
action, on the grounds of a ‘strategic convergence between responsible
leaders on the side of both the regime and the national liberation movement’.
The moderate centre, on this view, had to be ‘given the space and time to get
on with the task’, and mass struggle must be contained to avoid disrupting
negotiations. The second ‘turning on the tap’ position, according to the
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SACP leader, was to view mass struggle as an instrument to assist elite
negotiators. ‘Struggle’, on this elitist and instrumentalist view, ‘is essentially
envisaged as a weapon “to bring the other side to its senses”’.
Cronin favoured a third ‘Leipzig Way’ (a terminology derived from
recently concluded popular struggles against Communist ruling parties in
Eastern Europe). This model, according to Cronin, conceived of a mass
uprising that builds ‘dual power’, over-throws an incumbent regime and
‘replaces it with the emergent organs of popular power. It is a perspective
in which the people transfer power to themselves in an insurrectionary
moment’ (Cronin 1992).
Cronin conceded that ‘our present political situation is neither on the
brink of an insurrectionary moment, nor is it blocked … We are now living
in an extremely fluid political conjuncture’. He concurred with critics that
‘there are particular dangers and weaknesses in propagating a strategy
whose medium term success is at best uncertain’. Nevertheless, he insisted
that only ‘a process of self-empowerment by the popular masses spear-
headed by the working class’ could ensure that ‘we carry a mobilised,
organised mass constituency into and through the process of constitutional
negotiations, and onwards’. The ideal, he claimed, was ‘to achieve both a
significant negotiations breakthrough and maintain mass momentum …
When we have a democratically elected government, mass mobilisation will
be just as essential, but now, amongst other things, to enable the
implementation of its popular mandate’ (Cronin 1992).
Cronin’s warning about the dangers of demobilisation and statism was
prescient. But his insistence that the ANC needed to ‘rebuild and reawaken
the web of relatively independent mass democratic formations and struggles
that characterised the 1980s’ was not influential within the ANC leadership
at the time.
The movement’s evolution from a party of exile (and prison) to a mass
movement bequeathed an uneasy juxtaposition of hierarchical and
democratic centralist ideals (from the exile movement) and mass organisational
ambitions (primarily from domestic anti-apartheid struggle). Meanwhile, as
an electoral party in a representative democracy, the ANC also had to
become more ‘catch-all’ in character (Lodge 2004).
Better fewer but better?
Debate over the appropriate size and composition of the ANC’s membership
was subdued in the Thabo Mbeki era. The relative stability of membership
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numbers nevertheless ended with the election of Mbeki to the presidency
of the ANC. His rise generated enthusiasm, and perhaps other changes in
the politics of the Eastern Cape, and these helped to transform it into the
biggest ANC province by membership (a matter to which we return later in
the paper).
Mbeki nevertheless advanced a conservative recruitment philosophy. In
an address to an ANC policy conference in Kempton Park on September 27,
2002, he argued that the ANC requires ‘the kind of cadre of our movement
… who strives at all times to raise his or her political consciousness … who
works continuously to improve his or her skills to enhance his or her capacity
to serve the people of South Africa … who is loyal to the movement,
dedicated to its cause and respects the discipline of a movement she or he
would have joined voluntarily, with no compulsion by anybody’ (Mbeki
2002). It may be that ‘not everybody accepts what some may consider to be
burdensome obligations of membership of the ANC’, the ANC president
continued. ‘We are permanently interested in increasing the size and
strength of our movement. Nevertheless I am convinced that we must also
pay particular attention to the principle – better fewer, but better!’
This phrase was borrowed (with great intellectual license) from a paper
written by Vladimir Lenin six years after the Russian revolution. Lenin had
explored how the Communist Party could effectively manage a state
bureaucracy. Mbeki’s emphasis, by contrast, was on disciplinary mechanisms
and on the doctrine of democratic centralism. He encouraged delegates ‘to
express themselves freely on all the matters on our agenda’, claiming that ‘we
must sustain the spirit of open debate that has informed our preparations for
this Conference’. But ‘when we have taken our decisions’, he insisted, ‘we
must therefore respect and defend the agreed positions of the movement’
(Mbeki 2002).
Bigger can be better
In the years that followed Mbeki’s speech, membership soared in KZN and
Eastern Cape, the ‘home provinces’ of the president and his deputy, Jacob
Zuma, the two contenders for the ANC presidency. The pattern of membership
growth cannot plausibly be presented as an outcome of any overall national
strategy concerning recruitment and it culminated in the major political
confrontation at the Polokwane conference in 2007 (which space does not
permit us to analyse here).
At Polokwane, the movement resolved to grow across the country as a
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whole, and this culminated in the Imvuselelo campaign, launched in 2010.
This campaign was ostensibly designed to realise a conference resolution
charging the National Executive Committee to ‘take steps to practically
implement the target set by the 1942 Conference of 1 million members by the
time of centenary celebrations’. The intention of the ANC, secretary general
Gwede Mantashe later observed, was to complement recruitment with
‘intensive branch political education programmes to improve the quality of
members’ (ANC 2012b, 3.1.1.) Indeed, he asserted in a somewhat Hegelian
manner at the 2012 conference at Mangaung that, ‘quantity and quality are
not mutually exclusive’ because ‘active political education and involvement
of membership in the political life of the organisation can transform the
quantity into quality’ (ANC 2012b). The nascent electoral threat posed by
the Democratic Alliance, he further argued, offers a ‘reminder that there will
be need for a bigger machinery and visible presence in all the wards’. A
bigger membership would be ‘a necessary step in building the necessary
capacity for taking on any competition in future … The ANC should ideally
have 2.5 million members to be competitive’. Finally, Mantashe insisted that,
‘every South African has the potential of becoming a good member of the
ANC and we should not assume otherwise’. He could not but concede that
the ANC ‘cannot deliberately stop people from joining it’ (ANC 2012b: 3.2.2).
Subnational determinants of membership growth: candidate lists
While debates about recruitment and quality continued, sub-national politics
was relentlessly driving an increase in numbers. In part this was because
party membership was useful to communities: the state was broadly
insensitive to the needs of citizens, and party networks served as instruments
for communities to unlock state resources (Bénit-Gbaffou 2012) – as well as
for individuals to access and control resources for private gain (Motlanthe
2005).
The ANC describes itself as a mass organisation and branches are
ostensibly the ‘basic unit of the organisation’ (ANC 2007b: 23.1). Only a
branch in ‘good standing’ is entitled to participate in elective and policy
conferences. But competing national, provincial, regional and local leaders
try to secure the power that comes with support from accredited voting
delegates. The resulting manipulation was explored in a confidential NEC
report on the widely disputed candidate list process for the 2010 local
government elections, entitled ‘The investigating task team on list and other
disputes’, henceforth the TT (ANC 2012d).
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The Task Team Report
At Mangaung, ANC secretary general Gwede Mantashe selectively quoted
some of the findings of the TT appointed by the NEC to probe irregularities
in the candidate selection process for the 2010 local government elections
(ANC 2012d). Chaired by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the team included two
NEC members (Naledi Pandor and Ellen Molekane) and respected veterans,
including Lehlohonolo Moloi, Nonzwakazi Sigxashe and Archie Whitehead.
The 2010 list process was meant to be conducted according to the ‘Final
guidelines for the local government candidate selection process: 2010 local
government elections’ prepared by the NEC (ANC 2010). After numerous
complaints from across the country about how the list process unfolded in
practice, and formal letters of complaint to the secretary general, the TT was
asked to investigate departures from the guidelines and manipulations of
processes designed ‘to get to predetermined outcomes’ (ANC 2012d: 2).
In an apparently exhaustive study, TT members investigated the entire
list process, from the operations of branch meetings, to screening committees
and public consultation meetings, in a total of 419 wards. It also interviewed
members of regional list committees, regional executive committees, provincial
list committees and provincial executive committees. The key finding of the
TT with regard to the membership system concerned prevalent modes of
manipulation of the system. In particular, ‘instances of either “bulk
membership” or “gatekeeping” were a common feature’ (ANC 2012d: 1-2).
Bulk membership buying involves ‘the depositing of membership money
with the bank and obtaining bank stamps on blank forms that were then filled
in before, or even at, meetings, sometimes using the names of people who
were not even ANC members’ (ANC 2012d: 2). ‘The observed trend’, the TT
continued, ‘is that members are no more treated as important human beings’.
Instead, ‘the focus is more on consolidation of membership in terms of
people but rather the buying of forms which can be given to anyone as they
can be owned by those that have resources’ (ANC 2012d: 13).
There were also ‘numerous instances of parallel membership regimes
within a single branch’. In such cases, local power-brokers held on to
membership forms and refused ‘to hand them to the appropriate office’. The
‘owners’ of these forms then used them to make quorate meetings impossible.
Other regrettable practices included the organisation of boycotts (also in
order to make quorums impossible) and the emergence of ‘parallel
memberships’, especially in the Eastern Cape, in which competing branch
and regional structures often held meetings in different venues (ANC 2012d:
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2). In two provinces, members were excluded from branch meetings because
their names did not appear on informal lists of members acceptable to
provincial power-brokers (ANC 2012d: 2).
In another common abuse, activists found reasons to disallow branch
meetings until the ‘three meeting rule’ kicked in. This allowed a meeting to
be held without quorum, so rendering it vulnerable to manipulation by a small
group of members (ANC 2012d: 3). ‘Screening committees’ that were meant
to vet candidates were routinely manipulated, and in many cases there was
no screening at all (ANC 2012d: 5). Businesspeople keen to seize local
government office on occasion joined the ANC only after securing nomination
by the use of nefarious practices (ANC 2012d: 5). Such outsiders often
‘exerted undue pressure and influence on members of the branch to choose
certain candidates who would facilitate for them to get tenders and other
business opportunities’ (ANC 2012d: 13). On occasion, this involved ‘buying
of bulk membership for certain people who would be used to ensure that
certain candidates [were] nominated and selected’ (ANC 2012d: 13).
‘Conversely’, the team noted, ‘some branch members prevent other people
from joining the organisation’ (ANC 2012d: 13).
The devastating catalogue of abuses identified by the TT exhibited
various provincial variations. Free State provincial leaders, for example,
brazenly overturned properly reached nominations (ANC 2012d: 6). In North
West, there was ‘deep seated factionalism, tribalism, regionalism, gatekeeping
and bulk buying of membership’ (ANC 2012d: 8). The Eastern Cape
experienced proliferating ‘parallel structures’. But the problems the TT
exposed were mostly of a systemic character and afflicted pretty much every
part of the organisation.  ‘It is worth noting’, the final report observed, that,
‘almost every province had experienced violent protests and growing
intolerance emanating from amongst others dissatisfaction with the
nomination and selection of candidates’ processes’ (ANC 2012d: 4).
The report (which has never been publicly released) set out clearly many
of the local dynamics that underlie membership number growth. The TT also
reported that provincial and national deployees, sent to branch meetings to
resolve disputes and to ensure an open contest, failed to serve as effective
arbiters. Indeed provincial leaders apparently failed to supervise registration
and verification processes, and turned a blind eye (at best) to illegitimate
participation from outside branches and to other forms of manipulation
(ANC 2012d: 3).
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Manipulation in the provinces: the Free State conference of 2012
‘Branch members’ can participate in candidate selection contests whether
they are real human beings or ghost paper membership forms. They can also
participate in competitions for ANC leadership positions at sub-national
level. At Mangaung, Mantashe observed that two kinds of manipulation
have been especially prevalent. First, members are ‘falling through the
cracks, either as a result of gatekeeping or mere inefficiency in capturing of
membership’. Gatekeeping, according to Mantashe, ‘is not a technical
problem but a political one, wherein members of the ANC are deliberately
excluded from processes’ (ANC 2012b). Second, an opposing tendency sees
the creation of inactive or ‘paper members’ who are ‘recruited’ (or whose
existence is manufactured) ‘by leaders with political and economic
aspirations’.
Manipulation in provincial level ANC elections has been explored by the
constitutional court as a result of a legal action brought by members in the
Free State upset about improper processes in advance of, and during, the
province’s regional conference in mid-2012. The appellants ‘sought to
review the lawfulness of the Free State regional conference and the decision
of the ANC to accept the outcome of that conference’.  They claimed that
the ANC ‘ignored and failed to investigate’ alleged irregularities and that the
provincial secretary ‘deliberately turned a blind eye to these discrepancies,
which were brought to its attention on numerous occasions’ (Constitutional
Court 2012: Section 46). The appellants’ material grievances concerned ‘the
question whether the delegates to the elective Provincial Conference had
been properly accredited and audited as required by the ANC’s constitution
and its Membership Audit Guidelines’. The answer, according to the
justices, was that they had not been so accredited or audited (Constitutional
Court 2012: Section 90).
Delegates often had not been ‘duly mandated or elected’ at ‘a properly
constituted branch general meeting of ANC members in good standing’.
There were instances of ‘the manipulation of the membership numbers in
specific branches’, which enabled factional leaders ‘to send delegates to the
provincial conference or to send a different number of delegates than they
would lawfully be entitled to’, or even ‘to purportedly make a quorum or fail
to quorate’. The court also found compelling evidence of ‘the exclusion of
bona fide delegates who had been elected at properly constituted branch
general meetings’ and the shutting out of ‘members in good standing from
participating in the election of delegates’. In addition, there was ‘the
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establishment of parallel structures and the decision to allow and sanction
the participation at the provincial conference of ‘delegates’ from parallel
structures in respect of which disputes had not been resolved, as well as
permitting more than one parallel branch to qualify for the provincial
conference’ (Constitutional Court 2012: Section 90). The court appended to
its judgement detailed evidence concerning these manipulations of process.
In a striking parallel with the conclusions of the secretive TT investigation,
the justices found that NEC members deployed in audit teams were
incompetent or partisan. They also failed ‘to give branches an opportunity
to query the audit findings in breach of the audit guidelines’ or to ‘give
recognition to nominations legitimately made by ANC branches in respect
of the membership of the provincial executive committee’ (Constitutional
Court 2012: Section 90).
De Vos (2012) observes that, ‘reading through these list of irregularities,
it is difficult not to conclude that those in charge of the Free State ANC and
some NEC members who supported the re-election of the Provincial Executive
Committee (and perhaps President Jacob Zuma), at best turned a blind eye
to serious irregularities and pre-conference vote rigging and at worst
participated in it’. It is to this relationship between provincial and national
levels that we now turn.
National leadership: the road to Mangaung
Selective recruitment and exclusion incentives
Secretary general Mantashe observed at the Mangaung conference that
some provinces had recruited more members than others. ‘They must be
commended for continuing to drive the campaign beyond the centenary
celebrations’, he noted. However, he drily observed, ‘let us hope that the
driving force behind the campaign was not just a desire to have more
delegates to the national conference’ (ANC 2012b, 3.1.2.).
Membership numbers have played a big part in campaigns for national
leadership positions since 1991. ANC leaders face incentives to increase
audited ‘membership’ in regions and provinces in which they are popular
(and in which their factional allies enjoy organisational control) and to
minimise delegate numbers from areas controlled by their opponents. This
creates incentives to use procedural manipulation to disqualify members or
whole branches from such elections. Selective recruitment and exclusion
ultimately turns around the institution of the branch because of the role
assigned to it in the ANC constitution. Ninety per cent of delegates come
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from ‘properly constituted branch general meetings’ (ANC 2007b: 10). The
number of delegates is broadly in proportion to paid up membership, and
each branch ‘in good standing’ is entitled to at least one delegate (ANC
2007b: 11).
After 1997, when Thabo Mbeki became ANC president, the Eastern
Cape’s comparative membership statistics began to change. The bigger
ANC provinces previously shared broadly similar membership numbers, and
the Eastern Cape was smaller than its KZN and Limpopo counterparts. By
the end of Thabo Mbeki’s first term as ANC president in 2002, however,
Eastern Cape had leapfrogged its peers to become the biggest province by
far (see diagram 1).
Diagram 1
Source: Adapted from ANC 2007a, 2012b
Perhaps as a result of delusions of indispensability that grip many incumbent
factions, the president’s allies (and perhaps the president himself) seemed
determined to retain control of both the ANC and the state, after the end of
Mbeki’s expected two terms. This dynamic culminated in Mbeki’s decision
to ‘make himself available’ for a third term as ANC president in 2007. Mbeki
manufactured a situation in which his deputy, Jacob Zuma, was his only
conceivable challenger. But this putative successor had then (predictably
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and perhaps not coincidentally) fallen under a cloud of corruption
investigations.
The growth in ANC membership in Eastern Cape during Mbeki’s second
term as ANC leader in part reflects the national leader’s particular popularity
in his home province or among his ethnic constituency. It also reflects the
power that an incumbent enjoys to ramp up recruitment selectively. The
ANC leadership in KZN, however, was a political actor in its own right, with
resources to deploy and opportunities to seize. It proved able to capitalise
on the steady deterioration of support for the Inkatha Freedom Party. The
2007 Polokwane conference saw Mbeki’s ejection from the ANC presidency
by a cross-national anti-Mbeki coalition. Although the anti-Mbeki majority
enjoyed support in all provinces (including a third of delegates from the
Eastern Cape) it was bolstered by the almost universal backing for Zuma’s
leadership bid that he enjoyed in his own home province of KZN.
Before the 2012 Mangaung conference, membership numbers again rose.
In Limpopo and KZN, membership grew (at an accelerating rate) across the
whole period between the conferences, with KZN membership tripling
between 2007 and 2012. Other provinces in which Zuma enjoyed strong
support also grew very rapidly: Mpumalanga saw expansion (at least on
paper) from 55,000 to 132,000; and Free State membership rose to a new high
of more than 120,000 according to what were controversial audited data from
June 2012. Provinces in which Zuma enjoyed less popularity saw membership
decline over the same five-year period.
Two months before Mangaung, according to some reports, provincial
and regional auditors colluded with national auditors to inflate membership
numbers selectively so as to favour Zuma’s re-election bid. Branches were
allegedly allowed to push up members if they were perceived to be pro-Zuma,
and to import members from other branches to reach delegate-eligibility
thresholds. There were also more reports of ghost members, with one source
in the Nkomati region claiming that ‘leaders believe that, for every 100
members you are entitled to send two delegates to Mangaung… They
pumped in R600 000 to pay for membership’ (Mail & Guardian October 12,
2012).
Mantashe observed at Mangaung that 620 of the ANC’s 4,307 branches
(which amounted to 14 per cent of the total) did not qualify to send delegates
to the conference. Most of these branches came from the Eastern Cape, the
North West and the Western Cape – a reflection, according to Mantashe, of
‘the fact that in the majority of branches there is little or no political life’ (ANC
29
The politics of numbers in the ANC
2012b). But Zuma’s allies controlled senior ANC positions in these provinces
and may have used their influence to undermine anti-Zuma branches.
Prospects and potential reforms
Zuma has condemned the electoral perversions from which he appears to
have benefited. The ANC, he has asserted, needs to review its election
systems ‘in order to enhance internal democracy, credibility of the process,
as well as the integrity and suitability of candidates’ (ANC 2012c). Such
changes are necessary to ‘protect the ANC from the tyranny of slates,
factions and money’.
The 2012 conference endorsed a new focus on organisational issues,
announcing (not for the first time) a ‘decade of the cadre’ and a
‘comprehensive political school system’. Activists will allegedly be subjected
to ‘performance monitoring’; ‘firm and consistent action’ will instil discipline;
and ‘integrity commissions’ will purportedly blossom (ANC 2013: 4-6).
Inside Luthuli House, ANC head quarters, an information technology
revolution will apparently sweep aside antiquated membership and
communications systems.
Mantashe has spoken about the benefits that will flow from ‘workshops
to train branch representatives on the membership audit’ and improvements
in record keeping. The secretary general has also identified ways to minimise
membership gatekeeping by centralising membership card distribution. In
Mantashe’s eyes, ‘empowering the branches and members will ultimately
save the movement’. He also, however, argues that, ‘unless the ANC invests
sufficient resources in the appropriate IT system, problems of membership
management will visit us from time to time… Modern technology is not a
luxury and there should not be any reluctance in investing in it’ (ANC 2012b:
3.1.3).
These positive proposals may well be too little and too late. Money-
fuelled lobbying plays a prominent role in almost every city and province.
Cycles of money and power connect public offices to ANC positions.
Auditing, accreditation, and record-keeping systems are deeply distrusted.
Three times in every five years, the movement is paralysed by elective or
candidate list processes.
The weaknesses of internal systems meanwhile threaten to undermine the
ANC’s ability to perform the broader functions of a political party or
liberation movement. It will find it increasingly hard to serve as a strong
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bridge between activist citizens and the national political elite, because it can
neither communicate the discontents of ordinary people to the leadership
effectively nor serve as an instrument for the political education and
mobilisation of the poor. A movement with technologically backward internal
systems, rampant factionalism, and exploding membership numbers is taking
enormous risks with its own future. A contested internal election that
possesses an ethnic or regional dimension could easily pose a threat to the
very survival of the ANC.
Note
1. I am grateful to Colin Bundy, Tom Lodge, and Jeremy Seekings for these
suggestions.
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